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Secrets, Lies, and Lessons from the Theranos
Scandal
LAUREN ROGAL†
Theranos, Inc., the unicorn startup blood-testing corporation, was ultimately laid low by a former
employee whistleblower. The experience of that whistleblower during and after her employment
illuminates detrimental secrecy practices within the startup sector, as well as legal and practical
barriers to corporate accountability. Theranos sought to avoid exposure by cultivating an
environment of secrecy and intimidation, and by aggressively extracting and enforcing nondisclosure agreements. The legal landscape for whistleblowers facilitated this strategy: while
whistleblowing employees enjoyed certain protections under anti-retaliation statutes, trade
secrets statutes, and common law contract principles, these protections were neither readily
accessible nor certain. This Article critically examines the contours and ambiguities of those legal
frameworks, using the Theranos case study, and offers observations on the need for a harmonized
public policy to facilitate private sector whistleblowing.

† Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. This Article is based on a presentation
given at the ComplianceNet 2019 Conference on Business Ethics at the Villanova University Charles Widger
School of Law. I thank the facilitators and participants of the conference for their insights and suggestions. In
addition, I thank Professors Peter S. Menell, Priya Baskaran, Gautam Hans, Jenn Oliva, and Lynnise Pantin for
their comments and extraordinary support, and Jacqueline Chan and Janae Wilson for their research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) have been making headlines. The
#MeToo movement revealed a pattern of corporations extracting NDAs from
sexual misconduct victims, effectively shielding the perpetrators, and
perpetuating their behavior.1 Former President Donald Trump notoriously
required NDAs from employees at the Trump Organization and his presidential
campaign.2 Long an unquestioned staple of corporate legal risk management,
NDAs have acquired a dubious reputation for concealing information that would
be in the public interest to disseminate.
The case of Theranos, Inc., a blood-testing startup once valued at $9
billion,3 invites critical assessment of NDAs and other mechanisms that curtail
whistleblowing. Theranos ultimately imploded in a wave of headlines and
indictments charging that the company fraudulently marketed diagnostic
technology that it knew to be defective and unreliable. At its height, Theranos
had over 800 employees,4 representing the best and brightest of Silicon Valley.5
From this sophisticated and professionally mobile staff, precious few
whistleblowers emerged. By the time a young woman named Erika Cheung
alerted regulators in 2015, Theranos had already exposed thousands of
consumers to the risk of faulty blood tests and wasted millions in investor
money.6
To prevent exposure by its workforce, Theranos’s founder and Chief
Executive Officer Elizabeth Holmes deployed two main strategies. First, she
cultivated an environment of secrecy and intimidation.7 Staff were
systematically isolated, monitored, and threatened or fired for questioning
company practices.8 Second, the company aggressively extracted and enforced
NDAs, threatening employees with crushing liability for revealing company
1. Heather Tucker, USA Gymnastics Says It Will Not Fine McKayla Maroney if She Speaks Out Against
Larry Nassar, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2018, 10:40 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/
2018/01/16/usa-gymnastics-mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar/1039025001/; Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s
Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/C6GP-KEFM; Emily Steel & Michael S.
Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Settled New Harassment Claim, Then Fox Renewed His Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment.html.
2. Haven Orecchio-Egresitz, How Trump Uses Money, Non-Disclosure Agreements, and Intimidation to
Muzzle the People Close to Him, BUS. INSIDER (June 18, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
how-trump-non-disclosure-agreements-intimidation-silence-mary-trump-book-2020-6; Scott Horsley, Sworn to
Secrecy: Trump’s History of Using Nondisclosure Agreements, NPR (Mar. 19, 2018, 6:28 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/19/595025070/sworn-to-secrecy-trumps-history-of-using-nondisclosureagreements.
3. JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP 183 (2018).
4. Id. at 295.
5. See id. at 30 (describing the recruitment of a cadre of Apple employees); id. at 95 (describing the
recruitment of employees from NASA and SpaceX). While many of its employees boasted lofty credentials,
Theranos also practiced nepotism, hiring, and promoting family members and friends with scant qualifications.
Id. at 98–99.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part IV.
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secrets.9 Holmes’s approach, which perpetuated the deception in the short term,
ultimately destroyed the company. There is much to be said about this culture,
particularly the failures of corporate governance and the role of corporate
lawyers who ought to have been fostering a culture of legal compliance.10 This
Article, however, focuses on how Holmes’s approach was abetted by the law.
While whistleblowers enjoyed certain rights and protections, these proved
difficult for employees to access.
The legal framework has improved considerably since 2015 due to the
enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act and its explicit protections for
whistleblowers.11 Yet as the Theranos story illuminates, practical barriers and
uncertainties remain. The company’s implosion illustrates the need for enhanced
and harmonized whistleblower laws that relieve workers of the burden of legal
knowledge and effectively transmit notice of avenues for protected
whistleblowing.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I relates the experience of Theranos
whistleblower Erika Cheung. Part II explores the dynamics of corporate
whistleblowing in the modern American workplace. Part III reviews the legal
landscape for corporate whistleblowing and the rights and risks of the employer
and employee. These include (1) anti-retaliation statutes, (2) trade secret
protection laws, and (3) the contractual principles governing NDAs. Part IV sets
Erika Cheung’s experience in the context of these discordant legal frameworks,
discusses the inaccessibility and uncertainties that beset them, and offers
principles for enhancing and harmonizing legal protections.

I. THE FALL OF THERANOS
In September 2015, Erika Cheung composed an email to the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees diagnostic
laboratories.12 She began by expressing trepidation: “I’ve been nervous to send
or even write this letter. Theranos takes confidentiality and secrecy to an extreme
level that has always made me scared to say anything . . . .”13 She then
painstakingly detailed her misgivings about her former employer’s unorthodox
(and, Cheung believed, illegal) laboratory protocols for its blood diagnostic
technology.14

9. See infra Part IV.
10. See, e.g., G.S. Hans, How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study, 37
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 427 (2021); Brent T. Wilson, Theranos and the Tale of the Disappearing Board of Directors,
63-APR ADVOC. (IDAHO) 10 (2020).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1833.
12. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 281.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Cheung had been a freshly minted graduate of Berkeley’s molecular and
cell biology program when she took a position at Theranos in October 2013.15
Assigned to perform quality control tests, she had had an unusually direct
window into the struggles of Theranos’s blood-testing technology.16 The devices
simply could not deliver reliable, replicable results.17 Even more unsettlingly,
Cheung had observed that unfavorable quality control test results were deleted
as anomalous.18 Worst of all, this had all happened while Theranos was installing
its technology in Walgreens pharmacies, exposing the public to the risk of false
blood test results.19
Theranos had developed tactics to prevent exposure by concerned
employees like Cheung. Secrecy and fear permeated the company culture.20
Employee teams were physically and intellectually segregated by means of
partitions, fingerprint scanners, and strict rules regarding the sharing of
information among teams.21 These communication barriers, while impediments
to scientific progress, successfully obscured employees’ full picture of Theranos
operations.22 Due to her position in quality control, Cheung was among the few
employees with full knowledge of the device failures.
The company also monitored, suppressed, and punished dissenting
voices.23 One such voice was that of Tyler Shultz, a friend of Cheung’s and the
grandson of Theranos director and former Secretary of State George Shultz.
When Shultz raised his concerns about Theranos’s quality control testing
directly with executives, he received false assurances and a scathing rebuke from
Theranos second-in-command Sunny Balwani.24 Balwani then reviewed the
company’s email traffic and traced Shultz’s information to Cheung, whom he
berated and tacitly threatened with termination.25 Shultz and Cheung were lucky:
other employees who questioned company practices had been quickly fired.26

15. Taylor Dunn, Victoria Thompson & Rebecca Jarvis, Theranos Whistleblowers Filed Complaints Out
of Fear of Patients’ Health: ‘It Started to Eat Me Up Inside’: ‘The Dropout’ Episode 4, ABC NEWS (Mar. 13,
2019, 9:56 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/theranos-whistleblowers-filed-complaints-fear-patientshealth-started/story?id=61030212.
16. Id.; CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 188.
17. Dunn et al., supra note 15; CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 188–90.
18. Dunn et al., supra note 15; CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 187–90.
19. Dunn et al., supra note 15.
20. Id.; CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 77 (describing employees’ fear of Balwani); id. at 116 (citing a fired
employee’s email to Holmes and Balwani, in which she denounced “a work environment where people hide
things from you out of fear”).
21. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 296–97.
22. Id. at 20, 32, 37, 142–43.
23. Id. at 297 (describing the monitoring of emails and internet browser histories); id. at 164 (describing
how employees who raised concerns were marginalized or fired).
24. Id. at 191–94 (describing how Shultz was reassured first by Holmes and scientist Daniel Young); id. at
196 (describing how Balwani “belittled everything from [Shultz]’s grasp of statistics to his knowledge of
laboratory science”).
25. Id. at 198 (citing Balwani’s parting words as “[y]ou need to tell me if you want to work here or not”).
26. See id. at 48–51 (describing the firing of a sales executive and general counsel for warning board
members about the company’s unrealistic revenue projections); id. at 114–16 (describing how a scientist was
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The Chief Financial Officer had been terminated on the spot when he questioned
the soundness of financial projections given to investors.27
Finally, Theranos relied on the aggressive use and enforcement of NDAs.
Cheung signed an NDA before she even interviewed with Theranos,28 and
another when she resigned.29 The final straw had been an unsuccessful joint
attempt with Tyler Shultz to present his grandfather with their misgivings.30 The
next day, Cheung submitted her resignation.31 The colleague who processed her
resignation demanded a fresh NDA, searched her backpack, and warned her
against posting anything about Theranos on online forums.32 This appears to
have been typical employee exit protocol. When one departing employee refused
to sign an NDA, Balwani ordered Theranos security officers to block his exit
from the property.33 When that failed, Balwani called the police to report the
man for theft, telling officers that the employee “stole property in his mind.”34
Theranos outsourced NDA enforcement to the law firm of Boies Schiller
Flexner LLP, where famed litigator David Boies often personally oversaw
Theranos matters.35 Cheung encountered Boies Schiller after Tyler Shultz
convinced her to speak with Wall Street Journal reporter John Carreyrou, who
was investigating Theranos. Shortly thereafter, Cheung received a letter from
Boies Schiller accusing her of revealing Theranos trade secrets and demanding
that she submit to an “interview” with Boies Schiller attorneys.36 Because the
letter was addressed to the home of a friend where Cheung was staying
temporarily, she concluded that Boies Schiller agents must have followed her.37
Boies Schiller was similarly aggressive in its confrontation of Carreyrou, Shultz,
and another Journal source pseudonymously known as “Alan Beam.”38
Months later, Cheung located a lawyer who provided a free consultation.39
The attorney informed her that she could notify CMS about Theranos’s

threatened with termination for raising lab protocol concerns and fired shortly thereafter for calling attention to
billing issues).
27. Id. at 8.
28. Rick Berke, Interview: Theranos Whistleblower Erika Cheung Thinks Elizabeth Holmes Should Spend
Years in Prison, KQED (May 2, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/science/1941045/interview-theranoswhistleblower-erika-cheung-thinks-elizabeth-holmes-should-spend-years-in-prison.
29. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 200.
30. Id. at 199.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 200.
33. Id. at 107.
34. Id. at 108.
35. Id. at 201.
36. Id. at 255–56.
37. Id. at 255.
38. Id. at 241–46 (relating a confrontation between Tyler Shultz and two Boies Schiller attorneys in his
grandfather’s home); id. at 254 (describing the behavior of Boies Schiller attorneys during a meeting with
Carreyrou); id. at 266 (describing Boies Schiller’s threats against Alan Beam).
39. Meera Jagannathan, Theranos Whistleblower: How to Prevent Another $600M Silicon Valley Disaster,
MARKETWATCH (May 17, 2019, 5:33 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/theranos-whistleblower-iwas-so-paranoid-about-theranos-and-them-spying-on-me-2019-05-15.
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regulatory noncompliance without legal exposure. The email triggered the
avalanche that would ultimately destroy Theranos. Regulators descended within
days,40 leading to the closure of Theranos’s laboratories,41 charges by the
Securities and Exchange Commission,42 and federal indictments for wire fraud
against Theranos founder and Chief Executive Officer Elizabeth Holmes and her
deputy Balwani.43
The Theranos story is singular in its sensational details, but it nevertheless
echoes familiar themes and provides generalizable lessons. While most
companies are not built entirely on fraudulent claims, Silicon Valley startups are
famous for hyping “vaporware” products that are still under development and
often never materialize.44 Many observers recognized the seeds of Theranos’s
fall in the tech industry’s pervasive “fake it till you make it” mentality.45
Theranos’s fanatical secrecy was also a more extreme version of common
Silicon Valley practices; Holmes deliberately patterned her management after
the famously secrecy-obsessed Steve Jobs.46 Moreover, as the next Part
explores, the intimidation and suppression of whistleblowers at Theranos shares
much with the rest of the American workplace.

II. WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
Erika Cheung’s experience aligns with much of the empirical research into
corporate whistleblowing. Approximately half of American private sector
employees claim to have personally witnessed misconduct in their workplace.47
Among the most common transgressions are health violations and lying to
external stakeholders.48 This Part describes the data on how and when employees
operate as a warning system for company problems.

40. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 282.
41. Id. at 289.
42. Id. at 296.
43. Indictment, United States v. Holmes, No. 5:18-CR-00258-EJD, 2020 WL 666563 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11,
2020), 2018 WL 3216817.
44. Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of High-Tech Companies, 8
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1–2 (1994).
45. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 296; Erin Griffith, Theranos and Silicon Valley’s ‘Fake It Till You Make
It’ Culture, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/theranos-and-silicon-valleys-fake-it-till-youmake-it-culture/; Howard Tullman, Why Fake It Till You Make It Is Finished, INC. (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.inc.com/howard-tullman/why-fake-it-til-you-make-it-is-finished.html.
46. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 151 (one former Apple employee was unperturbed by Theranos’s secrecy
practices, as Apple had been similar); see also Kif Leswing, Apple Lawsuit Shows the Company’s Extreme Focus
on Secrecy, CNBC (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/11/apple-lawsuit-shows-the-companysextreme-focus-on-secrecy.html (describing Apple’s need-to-know system where employees are kept in the dark
about other parts of their project).
47. ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, THE STATE OF ETHICS & COMPLIANCE IN THE WORKPLACE 6
(2018),
https://43wli92bfqd835mbif2ms9qz-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/
GBES2018-Final.pdf. This may include non-criminal conduct that violates company policies or professional
ethics. This figure has hovered around 50% consistently since 2000. Id.
48. Id.
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A large majority of employees who witness misconduct say that they report
it, most often to a supervisor.49 Employees are more likely to report wrongdoing
if they feel institutionally empowered, financially secure, and supported by
social and professional networks.50 Managers have a relatively high reporting
rate due to their sense of agency within the company and confidence that the
report will have an impact.51 Unionized employees, who enjoy the protection of
their collective bargaining contracts and fellowship of other members, also
report at high rates.52 Employees who do not report misconduct cite several
reasons, including the belief that the report would fall on deaf ears (59%), fear
of retaliation (46%), inability to report anonymously (39%), and the belief that
someone else would report in lieu of them (24%).53 These data sets do not
disaggregate according to whether the malefactor is in a managerial or nonmanagerial role, but it is reasonable to surmise that employees are more reluctant
to report their supervisors than their subordinates or employees at their level of
seniority.
The whistleblowing rate plummets in companies with a weak ethical
culture.54 The Ethics and Compliance Institute defines company culture as “the
shared understanding of what really matters in an organization, and the way
things really get done”—in short, the practices behind the window-dressing.55
In addition to lower reporting rates, weak ethical cultures are characterized by
much higher rates of observed misconduct, higher retaliation rates, and higher
percentages of employees reporting that they experienced pressure to
compromise their ethical standards.56 Troublingly, a full 40% of the American
workforce reported in 2017 that their company’s ethical culture was weak or
weak-leaning.57 Sixteen percent of employees reported experiencing pressure to
compromise their ethical or professional standards, and 63% believe that their
company rewards unethical behavior.58 Forty-four percent of reporters say they
experienced retaliation in 2017, which is double the percentage in 2013.59 The
spike in this figure may in part reflect greater sensitivity to the appropriate
handling of whistleblower reports.

49. Id. at 7.
50. ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER: A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE 2011
NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2 (2012), https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/05/inside-the-mind-of-a-whistleblower-NBES.pdf.
51. Id. at 6.
52. Id. at 7.
53. Id. at 5.
54. ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 47, at 10 (finding that 83% observed misconduct and
52% reported it).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id. at 9.
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External whistleblowing is rare in corporate America.60 According to a
2011 survey, only 18% of whistleblowers ever reported outside the company,
and 84% of those external whistleblowers attempted to report internally first.61
When asked what would motivate them to report externally, employees cited the
gravity and persistence of the misconduct, the likelihood that remaining silent
would result in harm to people or the environment, and the company’s failure to
redress their internal complaint.62 A minority cited the potential for monetary
reward,63 which certain public agencies offer.64 While a weak ethical culture
deters internal reports, it correlates to higher levels of external reporting.65
Employees are generally better positioned to identify corporate
malfeasance than resource-strapped regulators or other external stakeholders.
Overwhelmingly, they prefer to counteract such misconduct through internal
channels and are strongly disinclined to reveal their observations to external
parties. This dynamic is heavily informed by the balance of risks to themselves
versus others, which in turn is shaped by company culture, the employee’s
position in the company, and the employee’s understanding of their legal rights.
Part III describes the legal framework for whistleblowers.

III. THE WHISTLEBLOWER LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A whistleblower’s rights, and a company’s response, are governed by three
main areas of law. First, state laws generally prohibit employers from retaliating
against whistleblowers through termination, demotion, or other adverse action.
In certain circumstances, federal law may also prohibit such retaliation. On the
other hand, the law also generally gives companies the right to seek injunctive
and monetary relief if the employee has misappropriated its trade secrets, or file
suit for breach of contract if an employee has violated an NDA. This Part
explores the contours of and tensions between the rights of employer and
whistleblower.
A. ANTIRETALIATION LAWS
Employment in the United States is presumed to be at-will unless otherwise
provided by law or private contract.66 Nevertheless, most jurisdictions have long
recognized a common law tort of wrongful discharge when an employee is
60. Jonathan L. Awner & Denise Dickins, Will There Be Whistleblowers?, 34 REGULATION, Summer 2011,
at 36, 38–39.
61. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 50, at 2.
62. Id. at 14–15.
63. Id. at 14.
64. For example, see the description of whistleblower rewards provided by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in discussion supra Part II.A.2.
65. ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 50, at 13.
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT § 2.01 (AM. L. INST. 2015). For example, statutory
exceptions to at-will employment prevent the termination of employees based on their protected characteristics,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), their request for family or medical leave, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), or labor
organization activities, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).
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terminated for engaging in activities protected by “well-established public
policy.”67 Protected activities include refusing to commit a wrongful act,
requesting a legally mandated employment benefit in good faith, and reporting
“conduct that the employee reasonably and in good faith believes violates a law
or an established principle of a professional or occupational code of conduct
protective of the public interest.”68 The cause of action also typically covers
constructive discharge, where an employer knowingly creates working
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would resign, and, in some
states, demotions and other disciplinary acts.69
In the 1980s states began codifying these protections into whistleblower
non-retaliation statutes.70 Today, there is considerable variation in these laws,
both with respect to the coverage provided and the burden placed on
whistleblowers to comply with specific dictates in their reporting. Certain
federal statutes also provide whistleblower protections against retaliation,
though the availability and level of protection is uneven—reports of securities
or tax fraud trigger substantial protections and potential rewards,71 while
reporters to other agencies may not enjoy protection from retaliation at all.72
1. State Whistleblower Protections
Every state has at least one whistleblower protection statute forbidding
retaliation against employees who report misconduct, but the contours of these
laws vary significantly. The overall landscape was described by one
commentator as “murky, piecemeal, disorganized, and [variable] from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”73 For example, Massachusetts offers blanket
protection only to public sector workers,74 while next door, Rhode Island covers
not only private sector employees but also independent contractors.75 State laws
67. Id. § 5.01; Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1643 (2008).
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT § 5.02(a), (c), (e).
69. Id. § 5.01 cmt. c.; Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1028–29 (Cal. 1994); Balmer v.
Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Iowa 2000); Gormley v. Coca-Cola Enters., 109 P.3d 280, 282–83 (N.M.
2005); Anderson v. First Century Fed. Credit Union, 738 N.W.2d 40, 47 (S.D. 2007).
70. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary
Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 342 (2007).
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (authorizing rewards to securities whistleblowers), § 78u-6(h) (prohibiting
retaliation against whistleblowers); I.R.C. § 7623(a) (2019) (authorizing rewards to tax whistleblowers),
§ 7623(d) (protecting whistleblowers to the IRS from retaliation).
72. For example, private sector whistleblowers do not have protection from retaliation under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–55.
73. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1049 (2004).
74. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 185(a)(2) (2021). A bill proposed in 2019 would expand coverage to
private sector employees. S.B. 1100, 191st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019). While excluded from the general
whistleblower statute, certain private sector employees may find protection under subject matter-specific
legislation. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 149, § 187(b) (forbidding retaliation against whistleblower
employees of health care facilities).
75. 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-50-2(1) (2020).
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also vary significantly with respect to (1) whether they cover disclosures of all
legal violations, a subset of legal violations, suspected violations, or threats to
public welfare that do not violate the law; (2) whether they protect internal
whistleblowing or only reports to public authorities;76 (3) whether they prohibit
“pretaliation” efforts to prevent whistleblowing; (4) whether an employee must
exhaust internal reporting mechanisms to enjoy protection; (5) whether
employers are required to alert employees to their rights; and (6) the scope of
remedies available.
This diversity can perhaps best be illustrated by a comparison between
California’s relatively pro-whistleblower framework and New York’s anemic
protections. California offers broad coverage, expansive remedies, and
mandatory notice to employees of whistleblower rights. New York is a minefield
for whistleblowers, only protecting reports of actual legal violations and
requiring exhaustion of internal remedies without fully protecting internal
reports.
a. Pro-Whistleblower Statute: California
California’s whistleblower protection statute is unusually robust in most
respects. It protects private and public employees who report, or testify before a
public body, information they reasonably believe to reveal a violation of a
federal, state, or local law or regulation.77 The protection covers reports to
supervisors, other employees with the power to investigate or correct the
violation, and any government agency.78 Employers may not adopt or implement
any policy that prohibits employees from making such a report, and may not
retaliate against any employee whom the employer believes has made a report
or anticipates might make a report in the future.79
California law provides speedy redress to whistleblowers. Courts must
provide appropriate injunctive relief upon a showing of reasonable cause to
believe that a violation of the whistleblower law has occurred.80 Short of this
showing, courts must determine whether an injunction is “just and proper,”
considering the harm done to the employee as well as the “chilling effect on
other employees asserting their rights” under the whistleblower law.81 These are
relatively low thresholds for preliminary injunctive relief, which typically
requires the complainant to show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits and of

76. Enron whistleblower Sherron Watkins did not enjoy whistleblower protection under Texas law because
she reported accounting misconduct only to CEO Kenneth Lay and not to law enforcement. Sinzdak, supra note
67, at 1633.
77. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1102.5(a)–(b), 1106 (West 2021) (defining “employee” to include without
limitation public sector employees).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 1102.62(c).
81. Id. § 1102.62(a)–(b).
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irreparable harm.82 Moreover, the injunction in whistleblower cases may not be
stayed pending appeal.83 California also imposes criminal liability on employers
that trample whistleblower rights. Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of up to $5,000 for a corporation, or imprisonment of up to
one year and a fine of up to $1,000 for an individual.84
California law actively seeks to raise public awareness of whistleblower
rights and facilitate reports of wrongdoing. The Attorney General must maintain
a whistleblower hotline and refer calls to the appropriate government authority.85
This relieves whistleblowers of the need to identify the appropriate recipient for
their report. While the law does not expressly permit anonymous reporting, it
promises confidentiality during the “initial review” of the complaint.86
Employers must also “prominently display in lettering larger than size 14 point
type a list of employees’ rights and responsibilities under the whistleblower
laws, including the telephone number of the whistleblower hotline.”87
b.

Pro-Employer Statute: New York

New York offers comparatively weak protections to private sector
whistleblowers.88 Where California covers any disclosure that the whistleblower
reasonably believed revealed a violation of law, New York requires an actual
violation of a “law, rule or regulation which . . . creates and presents a
substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety, or which constitutes
health care fraud.”89 Moreover, disclosures are only protected if the employee
previously reported the violation internally and provided the company with “a
reasonable opportunity” to remedy the offending activity, policy, or practice.90
New York employers may not take adverse action against an employee
who discloses or “threatens to disclose” information under the statute.91 The
term “threatens” has been construed narrowly to deny protection to an employee
who merely expressed concern about a potential legal violation to the
employer.92 This creates a conundrum for whistleblowers: the statute requires
employees to report the violation internally and provide an opportunity to cure,
but the act of doing so may not be protected conduct. An employee who
82. See Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
83. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.62(e).
84. Id. § 1103.
85. Id. § 1102.7(a)–(b).
86. Id. § 1102.7(c).
87. Id. § 1102.8(a).
88. An amendment was introduced in 2019 to strengthen the private sector whistleblower laws but has not
been enacted. A.B. 7384, 2019 Leg., 243rd Sess. (N.Y. 2019). A separate statute protects civil servant
whistleblowers. See N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney 2021).
89. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a)–(c) (McKinney 2021).
90. Id. § 740(3). This doesn’t apply to situations where the employee gives information or testifies to a
public body already conducting an investigation. Id. § 740(2)(b).
91. Id. § 740(2)(a).
92. Roach v. Comput. Ass’n Int’l, Inc., 638 N.Y.S.2d 699, 700 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (stating that the statute’s
“scope cannot be expanded to provide a remedy to employees who merely allege perceived or implied threats”).
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complies with the law’s command to report the violation internally may
therefore have no recourse if the report triggers her dismissal. The inexorable
conclusion is that the employee must include a threat to disclose when raising
the violation with the employer. This exposes the employee to an even higher
risk of retaliation if it turns out that the company did not actually violate the law.
Moreover, unlike California, New York does not require any notice to
employees of their rights as whistleblowers.
New York law is also less favorable for whistleblowers with respect to
remedies. A prevailing complainant may receive an injunction, reinstatement,
compensatory relief, and payment of all costs and attorneys’ fees.93 The
employer is entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees if the court determines that the
claim was “without basis in fact or law.”94
As the comparison between California and New York illustrates, corporate
whistleblowers face very different legal shields and hurdles depending on their
jurisdiction. In addition to the general whistleblower protection statute, many
states have additional non-retaliation provisions for specific offenses.95 Such
supplementary provisions, while protective, add an additional layer of potential
uncertainty and confusion to employees seeking to determine their rights.
2.

Federal Whistleblower Protections

Federal law offers piecemeal protection to private sector whistleblowers,
the strength of which depends on the subject matter.96 Erika Cheung, for
example, reported violations of clinical laboratory regulations, which provide
virtually no whistleblower protection. In contrast, Theranos executives were
ultimately indicted for defrauding investors, an area of law that offers relatively
strong whistleblower protection.
a. Weak Whistleblower Protections: Clinical Laboratory Laws

The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 198897 (CLIA)
mandates certification of and quality standards for clinical laboratories that
test human specimens.98 It is administered by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services.99 Federal law provides no specific whistleblower

93. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(5).
94. Id. § 740(6).
95. For example, most states have enacted a false claims act that shields whistleblowers who report fraud
against state-funded programs. State False Claims Act, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND,
https://www.taf.org/state-laws (last visited July 31, 2021).
96. A bill to harmonize and expand private sector whistleblower protections died in committee in 2012.
H.R. 6409, 112th Cong. (2012).
97. Pub. L. No. 100–578.
98. 42 U.S.C. 263(a)-(b) (requiring certification), (f)(1) (requiring satisfaction of standards).
99. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA),
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA (last visited July 31, 2021).
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protection to laboratory employees who report CLIA violations.100 In certain
circumstances, however, they may be covered by whistleblower protections
under the False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA prohibits fraud against
government programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. 101 CLIA
violations may give rise to FCA violations in certain cases, such as if the
laboratory deficiencies rendered the billed services medically worthless102 or
if the laboratory falsely certified CLIA compliance as a condition of
payment. 103
Whistleblowers (called “relators”) may bring qui tam actions on behalf
of the United States for violations of the FCA. 104 The government may opt
to intervene and litigate the action, entitling the relator to an award of
15–25% of the proceeds, as well as reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees.
105
If the government does not intervene, the relator is entitled to
25–30% of the proceeds, as well as reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees.
106
Since 2009, the FCA has also entitled qui tam whistleblowers to “all relief
necessary to make [the whistleblower] whole,” if the whistleblower is
discharged, demoted, suspended, harassed, or otherwise discriminated
against due to their (1) lawful acts done in furtherance of a qui tam action or
(2) other efforts to stop violations of the FCA.107 Relief may include
reinstatement, double back pay, interest on back pay, and compensation for
any special damages.108
In order to access the FCA’s protections, the whistleblower must show
that they were engaged in FCA-protected activity and that the employer
knew their activity was protected under the FCA.109 This presents a hurdle
100. U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Off., GAO-06-416, Clinical Lab Quality: CMS and Survey Organization
Oversight Should be Strengthened 28 (2006). Legislation to protect laboratory whistleblowers was introduced
in 2005 but died in committee. Clinical Laboratory Compliance Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 686, 109th
Cong. § 2 (2005).
101. 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1).
102. See Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2011); U.S. ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline
Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 2001).
103. False certifications of legal compliance may create liability under the FCA when certification is a
condition of receiving a government benefit. U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125
F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266–67 (9th Cir. 1996).
Whether CLIA compliance is a condition of Medicare payment is a contested issue. See United States ex rel.
New Mexico v. Deming Hosp. Corp, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1150 (D.N.M. 2013) (dismissing the FCA claim
after finding that CLIA compliance is a condition of Medicare participation but not payment, and that CMS has
administrative measures to address violations other than nonpayment); United States ex rel. Porter v. HCA
Health Servs. of Okla., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0992, 2011 WL 4590791, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30,
2011) (declining to dismiss the relator’s claim under a false certification theory).
104. 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(1).
105. Id. 3730(d)(1).
106. Id. 3730(d)(2).
107. Id. 3730(h)(1).
108. Id. 3730(h)(2).
109. United States ex rel. Strubbe v. Crawford Cty. Mem. Hosp., 915 F.3d 1158, 1166 (8th Cir. 2019);
Singletary v. Howard Univ., 939 F.3d 287, 293 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Fakorede v. Mid-South Heart Center, P.C.,
709 Fed.Appx. 787, 789 (6th Cir. 2017).
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for whistleblowers who merely report regulatory violations.110 To be
protected under the FCA, they must reasonably believe the regulatory
noncompliance has or will amount to fraud against the government.111
Moreover, they must put the employer on notice that their protected activity
relates to the filing of false or fraudulent claims.112 A laboratory worker who
simply identifies and reports CLIA violations without tying the issue to
Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement is unlikely to receive FCA
whistleblower protection.113
b. Stronger Whistleblower Protection: Securities Laws
Federal securities statutes contain comparatively robust whistleblower
protections. Federal protection for employees who report suspected securities
laws violations began with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).
Enacted in response to the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals and the
role of whistleblowers in unearthing them,114 Sarbanes-Oxley forbade public
companies and their agents from retaliating against employees who report or
testify about what they reasonably believe to be securities violations or other
fraud against shareholders.115 Protected reports could be directed to any federal
regulator or law enforcement agency, member or committee of Congress, or
internal supervisor.116 The U.S. Supreme Court later held that the protection

110. See, e.g., Strubbe, 915 F.3d at 1167–68 (denying FCA whistleblower protection to hospital employees
who complained about medical treatment and financial practices but did not give the hospital notice that its
“behavior was fraudulent or potentially subjected it to FCA liability”).
111. Strubbe, 915 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Schuhardt v. Washington Univ., 390 F.3d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 2004));
Singletary, 939 F.3d at 296; Fakorede, 709 Fed. Appx. at 790. In Fakorede, a cardiologist’s expressed concern
over misattributed expenses and reminded the employer that an audit should verify compliance with federal law.
The Sixth Circuit upheld dismissal of the retaliation claim because the allegations did not support the conclusion
that he understood the relationship between the FCA and other federal law, or that his activity was motivated by
this connection. Id.
112. Strubbe at 1167–68.
113. See, e.g., United States ex rel. New Mexico v. Deming Hosp. Corp, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1165
(D.N.M. 2013) (dismissing the retaliation claim of a medical technologist who repeatedly reported CLIA
violations because “nothing…suggests that she raised any concerns with Defendants regarding fraudulent
billing, false claims, or any other activity that might be covered under the FCA. To the contrary, her statements
to Defendants raised concerns about quality control, documentation, and CLIA violations; there is no reference
to any statements regarding fraudulent claims or Medicare billing practices.”) In contrast, the Singletary
retaliation claim survived a motion to dismiss because the laboratory worker specifically told her employer that
lab conditions violated the conditions of its federal grant funding and urged her employer not to submit false
certification to the funding agency. Singletary, 939 F.3d at 301–302.
114. Enron’s vice president for corporate development blew the whistle internally to the CEO. Text of Letter
to Enron’s Chairman After Departure of Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/text-of-letter-to-enron-s-chairman-after-departure-of-chiefexecutive.html. WorldCom’s internal auditor blew the whistle about accounting fraud to the company’s board
of directors. Anitha Reddy, WorldCom Executive Sought Audit Delay, WASH. POST (July 9, 2002),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2002/07/09/worldcom-executive-sought-auditdelay/685a340a-2eb4-4db1-9904-2aaf18756df3/.
115. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
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from retaliation applied to independent contractors as well.117 Sarbanes-Oxley
also required public companies to establish internal channels for whistleblowers
to anonymously and confidentially report accounting and auditing concerns to
the board of directors.118
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(“Dodd-Frank”) enhanced whistleblower protections in the securities arena by
(1) extending their reach to privately-held companies,119 (2) permitting
anonymous and confidential reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC),120 (3) authorizing the SEC to enforce anti-retaliation provisions
directly,121 and (4) mandating the payment of a bounty to whistleblowers who
“voluntarily provided original information” to the SEC that led to sanctions of
$1 million or more.122 The “original information” requirement prevents people
from piggybacking on the original whistleblower’s report in order to claim the
bounty, which amounts to 10–30% of the aggregate sanctions imposed on the
company.123
The SEC also promulgated Rule 21F-17, which forbids employers from
attempting to undermine its whistleblower programs by contract, stating that
“[n]o person may take any action to impede an individual from communicating
directly with the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation,
including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality
agreement . . . with respect to such communications.”124 During the Obama
administration, the SEC enforced this rule against a number of companies that
sought to silence whistleblowers by contract. In one case, the SEC fined
Anheuser-Busch InBev for executing a separation agreement that imposed
confidentiality requirements and liquidated damages of $250,000 for any breach
thereof.125 The confidentiality provisions did not expressly forbid
communication with the regulator, but neither did it include a carve-out for
whistleblowing.126 In 2014, the chief of the SEC Office of the Whistleblower
threatened that, “if we find that kind of language, not only are we going to go to
the companies, we are going to go after the lawyers who drafted it.”127

117. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 433 (2014).
118. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1(m)(4).
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (stating that “[n]o employer” may retaliate against whistleblowers).
120. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2)(A)
(anonymity), (h)(2)(A) (confidentiality).
121. Sarbanes-Oxley provided only a private right of action. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1), (b)(1).
123. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17 (2020).
125. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Release Act No. 78957, at 24–27 (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78957.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Brian Mahoney, SEC Warns In-House Attys Against Whistleblower Contracts, LAW360 (Mar. 14,
2014, 5:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/518815/sec-warns-in-house-attys-against-whistleblowercontracts.
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Both state and federal anti-retaliation laws are characterized by their
variability. A company and employee might find themselves subject to multiple
laws at the state and federal levels with different subject matter coverage,
reporting protocol, and remedies. One common theme, however, is that
regardless of the law at issue, whistleblowers seldom prevail in their retaliation
claims.128 A 2013 study of state court decisions by Professor Nancy M. Modesitt
found that employers succeeded the trial or administrative hearing level 93% of
the time.129 On appeal, decisions favoring the employer were affirmed 81% of
the time.130 Most often, courts deny whistleblowers relief for failure to show a
causal connection between their protected activity and the adverse employment
action.131 The record of Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation claims is equally dismal.132
Professor Richard Moberly examined the outcomes of administrative decisions
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, finding that claimants
prevailed less than 4% of the time.133 In their analysis of decisions, both
Modesitt and Moberly found that decisionmakers tend to interpret whistleblower
protections narrowly and favorably to employers.134 The paltry win rates are
difficult to interpret, as they surely include unmeritorious claims and do not
capture whether law has effectively deterred corporate retaliation.135 That said,
the severity of the skew towards employers speaks discouragingly of the
protective power of anti-retaliation laws. This landscape grows even more
complex and uncertain when considered in conjunction with trade secrets
doctrine, discussed in the following Subpart.
B. PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
Legal protection of trade secrets arose during the Industrial Revolution.
Preindustrial society protected commercially valuable knowledge through the
guild system and informal custom.136 Large-scale manufacturing eroded those
constraints, depersonalized production, and facilitated the unauthorized
appropriation of trade knowledge.137 By the mid-1800s, courts generally
recognized a property right in commercial know-how and a cause of action for
128. Nancy M. Modesitt, Why Whistleblowers Lose: An Empirical and Qualitative Analysis of State Court
Cases, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 165, 181 (2013) (reviewing cases brought under state statute and the common law
doctrine of wrongful discharge); Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years
Later, 64 S. CAR. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2012) (reviewing administrative decisions under SOX).
129. Modesitt, supra note 128, at 181.
130. Id. at 179.
131. Id. at 184.
132. Moberly, supra note 128, at 28–29.
133. Id. His first study showed a success rate of 3.6% from the statute’s enactment through mid-2005. His
follow-up study showed that from 2005 to 2011, claimants only won 1.8% of cases decided by OSHA. Moberly
partially attributed the low win rate to poor investigative practices and training at OSHA. Id. at 29–32.
134. Modesitt, supra note 128, at 189–92; Moberly, supra note 128, at 32–33.
135. Moberly, supra note 128, at 28.
136. Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 11 (2017).
137. Id. at 12.
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the misuse or theft of trade secrets.138 This has evolved into a complex web of
state and federal law.
1. State Trade Secret Protections
Until the 1980s, trade secret protection was primarily adjudicated at the
state level under the common law of unfair competition.139 This changed with
the American Bar Association’s approval of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA) in 1980 and its subsequent adoption by forty-eight states and the District
of Columbia.140 The UTSA expressly displaces all other civil remedies for
misappropriation except those sounding in contract law.141
The UTSA defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.142

This definition is broad but contains important boundaries. The first is that
a trade secret must provide a “competitive advantage [to] its owner over
competitors” that disclosure would undercut.143 Courts therefore examine the
realistic probability that disclosure will result in competitive harm, particularly
if the information is dated or general in nature.144 Some courts have also
distinguished trade secrets from information that may “injure a company’s
commercial standing [by exposing] defective products, poor or embarrassing

138. Id.
139. The Supreme Court held in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974), that
constitutional and federal statutory provisions regarding patents do not preempt state trade secret laws. New
York has not enacted trade secrets legislation but recognizes a common law cause of action for misappropriation.
Delta Filter Corp. v. Morin, 485 N.Y.S.2d 143, 143 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (“New York has substantially adopted the
approach of the original Restatement of Torts (1939) to the law of trade secrets.”); see also Schroeder v. Pinterest
Inc., 17 N.Y.S.3d 678, 690–91 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (applying the Restatement to a trade secret misappropriation
claim).
140. See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792 (last visited July 31, 2021).
141. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 7 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985). North Carolina has
adopted distinct trade secrets legislation but utilizes a very similar definition of “trade secret.” See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 66–152(3) (2020). New York courts have applied a definition from the Restatement of Torts, which
does not require efforts to maintain secrecy. See Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1012–13 (N.Y.
1993).
142. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4).
143. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 n.15 (1984).
144. See, e.g., Prairie Island Indian Cmty. v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 658 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2003) (discussing the competitive value of old financial information); Formax Inc. v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP
Equip., Inc., No. 11-C-0298, 2014 WL 792086, at *1–3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 25, 2014) (assessing the protection
afforded to general customer and financial data).
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business practices or similar commercial shortcomings.”145 In one case, the
Second Circuit scoffed that the fact of a company’s poor management is “hardly
a trade secret,”146 perhaps because such information, while embarrassing, does
not confer a competitive advantage. In a similar vein, some courts have
questioned whether trade secrets encompass “negative” information such as
failed experiments,147 but most authorities recognize that such information can
constitute a trade secret if it helps competitors save time or money.148
The second requirement is actual secrecy. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc.,149 the Supreme Court declared that trade secrets laws cannot
substantially interfere with the use of information already in the public domain
or discoverable from public sources.150 Efforts to maintain secrecy must be
“reasonable under the circumstances” but need not be extensive; in some cases,
it may suffice to simply inform employees that certain information is a trade
secret.151 More thorough measures may include systematically limiting
disclosure to employees or instituting password protections on the information
itself. Many companies introduced universal NDAs for employees to cover
themselves with respect to this requirement.152
Misappropriation encompasses two categories of conduct. First, it includes
the acquisition of a trade secret by means that the acquirer knows or has reason
to know are improper.153 Improper means include bribery, theft,
misrepresentation, espionage, and breach of a duty of secrecy,154 but generally
do not include reverse engineering.155 Second, it includes the unauthorized use
145. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 73 F. Supp. 3d 544, 580 (W.D. Pa. 2014); see also
Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 685 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding, in a newspaper’s action for access to evidence
used at trial, that “non-trade secret but confidential business information is not entitled to the same level of
protection from disclosure . . . . particularly where, as here, the commercial interest stems primarily from a desire
to preserve corporate reputation”).
146. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d
1059, 1074 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining where the company’s subsidiary was manufacturing scotch without a
permit, “the ‘sensitive’ information at issue here is not the kind of commercial information that courts have
traditionally protected, e.g., trade secrets. It simply involves a matter of poor management.” (citation omitted)).
147. See, e.g., Hurst v. Hughes Tool Co., 634 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir.) (finding insufficient evidence of a
trade secret where the information merely indicated “what not to do”), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981);
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 260 n.6 (E.D. La. 1967) (“[T]here is some doubt whether
such negative values are protected as trade secrets.”).
148. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985) (stating
that the definition of a trade secret “includes information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint,
for example the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will not work could
be of great value to a competitor”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (AM. L. INST.
1995).
149. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
150. Id. at 146–47.
151. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1 cmt.
152. See infra Part III.C.
153. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(2)(i).
154. Id. § 1(1).
155. Id. § 1 cmt. Companies have sought to circumvent the UTSA’s permissive policy towards reverse
engineering by introducing product licenses that disallow reverse engineering as a condition of accessing the
product. The legal validity of such license provisions, and their ability to trump the long-standing permissive
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or disclosure of a trade secret by a person who (1) obtained it through improper
means; (2) knew or had reason to know both that it was a trade secret and that
their acquisition of it arose from a mistake or accident; or (3) knew or had reason
to know that they had a duty to protect or limit its dissemination, or that their
information came through a third party who used improper means to obtain it or
had a duty to protect it.156
The UTSA provides for injunctive relief against actual or threatened
misappropriation, provided that the injunction last no longer than necessary to
eliminate the commercial advantage gained by misappropriation.157 Prevailing
plaintiffs may also receive damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment.158 In
the case of willful and malicious misappropriation, courts may award additional
exemplary damages of up to two times the calculated award.159 Attorneys’ fees
may be awarded in the case of certain bad acts, such as willful and malicious
misappropriation, bad faith efforts to terminate an injunction, and bad faith
claims of misappropriation.160
The UTSA does not address the tension between protection of
whistleblowing and protection of trade secrets. There is also no exception under
the UTSA for trade secret disclosures made in the public interest, though the
accompanying comments acknowledge that the public interest may sometimes
override a party’s interest in injunctive relief.161 Republic Aviation Corp. v.
Schenk162 is cited as an example of such an overriding public concern.163 In
Schenk, the defendant integrated misappropriated trade secrets into its aircraft
weapons control systems, which were sold to the U.S. Armed Forces.164
Enjoining the use of the technology, the court found, would endanger American
soldiers fighting in Vietnam.165 The UTSA stipulates that in such “exceptional
circumstances,” courts may permit continued use of the trade secret with the
payment of a reasonable royalty to the plaintiff.166

policy towards reverse engineering under trade secret doctrine, remain the subject of scholarly dispute and
judicial disagreement. Samuel J. LaRoque, Comment, Reverse Engineering and Trade Secrets in a Post-Alice
World, 66 KAN. L. REV. 427, 441–42 (2017).
156. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(2)(ii).
157. Id. § 2 cmt.
158. Id. § 3(a).
159. Id. § 3(b).
160. Id. § 4.
161. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 2 cmt.
162. Republic Aviation Corp. v. Schenk, 1967 WL 7717 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1967).
163. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 2 cmt.
164. Republic Aviation Corp., 1967 WL 7717, at *1–2; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985
AMENDMENTS § 2 cmt.
165. Republic Aviation Corp., 1967 WL 7717, at *7; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS
§ 2 cmt.
166. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 2(b).
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Federal Trade Secrets Protections

One year after Erika Cheung blew the whistle on Theranos, the law of trade
secrets got a shot in the arm. The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA)
created a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.167 Passed
unanimously in the Senate and by an overwhelming vote in the House of
Representatives,168 the statute closely mirrors the UTSA in many respects, while
also resolving certain ambiguities that emerged in UTSA jurisprudence.
The DTSA’s definition of “trade secret” comes from the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, which imposes criminal sanctions for the
misappropriation of certain trade secrets.169 This definition generally aligns with
the UTSA definition and adds a list of examples.170 Likewise, the definitions of
misappropriation and improper means generally align with the UTSA.171
The DTSA provides ample redress for companies that have suffered
misappropriation. Plaintiffs may receive damages for actual losses and unjust
enrichment, or, alternatively, the court may impose a reasonable royalty
payment.172 In the case of “willful and malicious” misappropriation, the court
may also award exemplary damages up to two times the calculated damages173
and reasonable attorney’s fees.174 A court may, in “extraordinary
circumstances,” order the seizure of the defendant’s property as necessary to
prevent disclosure of the trade secret.175
Unlike state laws derived from the UTSA, the DTSA directly tackles the
tension between whistleblower rights and trade secret protection. Section 1833
grants immunity from criminal and civil liability for the disclosure of a trade
secret (1) in confidence to a government official or attorney for the sole purpose
of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law, or (2) in a complaint
or other document under seal in a legal proceeding.176 Professor Peter S. Menell,
whose scholarship heavily influenced the provision, noted that, “the
whistleblower immunity provision is structured as an immunity and not a
defense. . . . Hence, courts should allocate the burden of proof on the trade secret
owner seeking to impose liability on a potential whistleblower.”177 This would
allow dismissal of the claim early in the proceedings, reducing the employee’s

167. Defend Trade Secrets Act § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b).
168. S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 5 (2016); H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 5–6 (2016).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (criminalizing misappropriation); id. § 1839(3) (defining “trade secret” under both
the DTSA and Economic Espionage Act).
170. Id. § 1839(3).
171. Id. § 1839(5)–(6).
172. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(B).
173. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(C).
174. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(D).
175. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i).
176. Id. § 1833(b)(1)(A)–(B).
177. Peter S. Menell, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Whistleblower Immunity Provision: A Legislative
History, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 398, 425 (2017).
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litigation burden and, therefore, the ability of employers to intimidate
whistleblowers with the threat of lawsuits.178
The DTSA has several other features that recognize the importance and
realities of workplace whistleblowing. First, it includes independent contractors
and consultants in the definition of “employee.”179 In an economy where
independent contractors comprise a substantial and growing share of the
workforce,180 depriving them of immunity would irrationally obstruct a
significant source of whistleblower information. Moreover, their experience
with a range of employers may equip them to detect suspicious practices more
readily than employees. Second, the DTSA expressly permits whistleblowers to
disclose trade secrets in confidence to an attorney for the purpose of
whistleblowing and the purpose of filing an anti-retaliation lawsuit.181 This
increases the likelihood that whistleblowers will proceed through lawful
channels and enjoy maximal protections. Third, employers are required to
provide notice to employees of whistleblower immunity under the DTSA in any
contract that governs the use of trade secrets or confidential information.182 As
an alternative, the employer can simply cross-reference a company policy that
sets forth the provision.183 Failure to notify an employee in this manner may
result in the denial of exemplary damages or attorney’s fees against the
employee.184
The DTSA did much to clarify the intersection of whistleblower and
employer rights, but certain gaps remain. First, in the few cases adjudicated thus
far, the DTSA’s immunity provision has not generally resulted in dismissal of
trade secrets claims at the pleadings stage.185 Rather than treating the provision

178. See id. at 417.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(4).
180. There is dispute over the precise number of independent contractors. The Department of Labor reported
that independent contractors comprised 6.9% of the labor market in 2017. Press Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat.,
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Contingent & Alternative Employment Arrangements–May 2017 (June 7, 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf. This figure is likely an underestimate, as the report’s
methodology omitted workers who do contract work to supplement their primary employment, or who did not
do contract work within the week the survey was conducted. Frequently Asked Questions About Data on
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/
cps/contingent-and-alternative-arrangements-faqs.htm (Aug. 7, 2018).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)(i).
182. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(A).
183. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(B).
184. Id. § 1833(b)(3)(C).
185. See, e.g., Unum Grp. v. Loftus, 220 F. Supp. 3d 143, 147 (D. Mass. 2016); 1-800 Remodel, Inc. v.
Bodor, No. CV 18-472-DMG (EX), 2018 WL 6340759, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2018); Garcia v. Vertical
Screen, Inc., No. CV 19-3184, 2020 WL 2615624, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2020); Argos USA LLC v. Young,
No. 1:18-CV-02797-ELR, 2019 WL 4125968, at *6 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 2019). Conversely, in Christian v.
Lannett Co., the court held that the employee’s disclosures fell within the DTSA’s immunity provision. Christian
v. Lannett Co., No. CV 16-963, 2018 WL 1532849, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018). The employee in Lannett
filed discrimination claims against the company, which counterclaimed trade secret misappropriation. Id. at *4.
The court found that the only disclosures made after the DTSA’s enactment occurred pursuant to a discovery
order in the discrimination case and that “despite numerous opportunities to conduct discovery on this issue,
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as akin to sovereign immunity, as Professor Menell intended, courts have treated
it as an affirmative defense.186 As such, a motion to dismiss may only be granted
if the complaint contains sufficient facts to establish the defense.187 In a welldrafted complaint for misappropriation, the company’s lawyers can avoid
including sufficient facts to establish all of the elements of the whistleblower
defense.188 In particular, it may be difficult to establish that the whistleblower
disclosed the trade secrets “in confidence” and “for the sole purpose of reporting
or investigating a suspected violation of law.”189 In one case where an employee
gave documents to his attorney, the court ruled that:
it is not ascertainable from the complaint whether [the employee] turned over
all of [the company’s] documents to his attorney, which documents he took
and what information they contained, or whether he used, is using, or plans to
use, those documents for any purpose other than investigating a potential
violation of law.190

In short, because courts have treated Section 1833 as an affirmative defense
rather than an immunity, it has not protected whistleblowers from potentially
costly and extended litigation.
Second, the DTSA leaves whistleblowers exposed to several sources of
liability. The protections of Section 1833 cover the disclosure but not the
improper acquisition of trade secrets.191 A whistleblower who emails company
data to their personal email account to preserve it for a covered disclosure may
thus be liable for misappropriation.192 Whistleblowers who take company files
may also have liability under statutes such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA),193 which forbids accessing a computer and taking information
without authorization, or in excess of authorization.194 Because whistleblowers
Defendant has failed to provide any facts which would enable the Court to discern whether Plaintiff intentionally
or accidentally disclosed the alleged trade secrets.” Id. at *5.
186. See supra note 185; Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend Trade
Secrets Act, 1 NEV. L.J.F. 92, 95 (2017) (“Rather than recognize that [the defendant] enjoyed immunity from
liability, the court [in Unum] treated the whistleblower provision merely as an affirmative defense. . . . This is
precisely the murky situation that Congress expressly corrected when it immunized employees and
contractors.”).
187. See Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of L., 389 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2004); Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp.,
570 F.2d 1168, 1174 n.10 (3d Cir. 1978); EPCO Carbon Dioxide Prods., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006).
188. See Unum, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 147; Garcia, 2020 WL 2615624, at *5; 1-800 Remodel, 2018 WL
6340759, at *6.
189. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)–(B).
190. Unum, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 147.
191. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1).
192. See 1-800 Remodel, 2018 WL 6340759, at *5 (denying a motion to dismiss where the defendant
“forwarded Plaintiff’s confidential and proprietary information from her work email account to her personal
email address. . . . These allegations also give rise to the plausible inference that Defendant committed theft to
acquire this information, which constitutes ‘improper means’ for the purposes of the DTSA”); Henry Schein,
Inc. v. Cook, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff stated a valid claim under
the DTSA when an employee forwarded trade secrets to her personal email account and devices).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
194. Id. § 1030(a)(1).
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often retrieve electronic files to substantiate their report of suspected
lawbreaking, CFAA claims often appear alongside misappropriation claims.195
Moreover, virtually every state also has a version of the CFAA that provides
companies with a cause of action.196 Professor Menell rightly contends that
because the DTSA whistleblower immunity covers the use of the files, damages
for wrongful acquisition alone would likely be quite limited.197 Nevertheless, the
prospect of litigation and liability under these laws may deter potential
whistleblowers who believe their disclosure will be fruitless without supporting
documentation. It could also blindside whistleblowers who were reassured by
the DTSA notice of immunity in their contract or company policy but did not
think to distinguish between acquisition and disclosure. Finally, the DTSA does
not expressly preclude liability for breach of contract.198 The next Subpart
explores the contractual principles governing the enforceability of NDAs in the
whistleblower context.
C. CONTRACTS FOR NONDISCLOSURE
Employee nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) are prevalent in the modern
workplace, particularly in the technology sector.199 Employers may introduce
standalone confidentiality agreements or include nondisclosure provisions in
employment contracts or binding employee policies or handbooks.200 This
Subpart examines the utility, content, and enforceability of NDAs extracted as a
condition of employment.201
NDAs serve several functions for employers.202 First, by specifying the
precise type of information that the company considers confidential, NDAs put
employees on notice of their obligations and increase the likelihood of
compliance.203 Second, NDAs demonstrate that the listed information is “the
subject of efforts . . . to maintain its secrecy” and thus meets the definition of a

195. See, e.g., Argos USA LLC v. Young, No. 1:18-CV-02797-ELR, 2019 WL 4125968, at *10–11 (N.D.
Ga. June 28, 2019); Christian v. Lannett Co., No. CV 16-963, 2018 WL 1532849, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018);
1-800 Remodel, 2018 WL 6340759, at *6–7.
196. See, e.g., Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 2021);
Personal and Commercial Computer Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-601–606 (2021).
197. Menell, supra note 177, at 426 (“If DTSA immunity applies, then the harm in such other causes of
action is limited to the cost of the paper, ink, or laptop computer that was allegedly stolen or damaged, and
cannot extend to the value associated with information contained on such media or device. Otherwise, the very
chilling effects that Congress sought to prevent through the DTSA whistleblower immunity provision would be
circumvented through these other causes of action.”).
198. See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1).
199. Jeff John Roberts, Why You Should Be Worried About Tech’s Love Affair with NDAs, FORTUNE (Apr.
29, 2019, 3:30 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/04/29/silicon-valley-nda/ (reporting that every low-level
employee and contractor at tech giants Google, Apple, and Amazon must sign nondisclosure agreements).
200. Richard Moberly, Confidentiality and Whistleblowing, 96 N.C. L. REV. 751, 761 (2018).
201. Employers often require NDAs as a condition of severance pay or as part of the settlement of claims.
202. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 157
(1998).
203. Id.
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statutorily protected trade secret.204 Third, companies with NDAs on file have
the option of bringing a contractual claim in addition to, or in lieu of, any other
causes of action that may be available against an employee who discloses
covered information.205 If another cause of action—such as trade secret
misappropriation—falters, the employer may retain a viable contractual claim.
Fourth, employers often use NDAs to conceal information that does not
constitute a trade secret.206 The hallmark of a trade secret is that it offers some
sort of business or competitive advantage that disclosure would undercut. NDAs
may cover more generic categories of “confidential” or “proprietary”
information.207 Some authorities claim that these terms are coextensive with
trade secrets,208 but many recognize confidential and proprietary information as
encompassing a broader category of protectable information, such as financial
forecasts and performance data.209 NDAs may introduce their own definitions of
confidential or proprietary information, with broad formulations such as
“information . . . that would . . . otherwise appear to a reasonable person to be
confidential or proprietary in the context and circumstances in which the
information is known or used.”210 They may even take on the flavor of nondisparagement agreements, covering information that is merely embarrassing,
such as incidents that reveal incompetence or bad character.211 The NDA used
by Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign exhibits the remarkable breadth
204. Menell, supra note 136, at 16 (quoting UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985)).
205. See, e.g., Garcia v. Vertical Screen, Inc., No. 19-3184, 2020 WL 2615624, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 22,
2020).
206. Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property,
93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 810 (2015) (“Contractually, it has become standard to include broad and open-ended lists
of confidential information that goes beyond the statutory definition of trade secrets.”); Norman D. Bishara,
Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other
Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 43 (2015) (“[T]he majority of firms will seek the
broadest possible restrictions.”).
207. The Restatement of Employment Law states that employers have a legitimate interest in protecting
“other protectable confidential information that does not meet the definition of trade secret.” RESTATEMENT OF
EMP. L. § 8.07(b)(1) (AM. L. INST. 2015). The comments, in explaining confidential information, are unhelpful
in that they effectively restate the definition of a trade secret and cite no illuminating examples. See id.
208. See, e.g., United Rug Auctioneers, Inc. v. Arsalen, No. CA03-0347, 2003 WL 21527545, at *6 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2003) (“Trade secrets and confidential information are essentially identical concepts.”).
209. See, e.g., Erhart v. Bofl Holding, Inc., No. 15-CV-02287-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 588390, at *9 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (recognizing that the company “has an interest in protecting other confidential business
information that may not qualify for trade secret protection”); Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 630 Fed. App’x 566,
571–74 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that, under Texas law, protectable confidential information does not need to
have trade secrets status “so long as it does not encompass publicly available information or an employee’s
general knowledge or skills”); FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b)(2) (2021) (deeming “[v]aluable confidential business
or professional information that otherwise does not qualify as trade secrets” protectable); Revere Transducers,
Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 765 (Iowa 1999); What Is Proprietary Information?, LAW DICTIONARY,
https://thelawdictionary.org/proprietary-information/ (last visited July 31, 2021) (stating that proprietary
information “can relate to budget information and research results”).
210. This language is provided in the Westlaw Practical Law sample employee confidentiality agreement.
Employee Confidentiality and Proprietary Rights Agreement, THOMSON REUTERS (2020).
211. Moberly, supra note 200, at 766–67 (finding that 64.1% of settlement agreements in Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower retaliation cases contained a non-disparagement provision).
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of some agreements, defining “Confidential Information” to include “any
information that Mr. Trump insists remain private or confidential,” including
information about the personal life, political affairs, and business affairs of
members of the Trump family.212 Such constructions provide minimal guidance
to employees and maximum recourse to employers.
Finally, NDAs serve to chill even protected employee disclosures. Because
employee NDAs often protect their own contents from disclosure, our
knowledge of their contents is largely anecdotal, based on accounts of
employment lawyers and the small percentage of NDAs that become public
through legal proceedings.213 This sampling nevertheless reveals a tendency
towards severe terms, including terms designed to intimidate whistleblowers out
of exercising their legal rights. For example, NDAs may require employees to
inform the employer any time they reveal information to the government.214 This
tactic was employed by the engineering firm KBR, Inc., which required internal
investigation witnesses to sign an NDA that threatened discipline or termination
if they revealed matters to outside parties without the prior approval of the
KBR’s legal department.215 Other draconian features include mandatory
arbitration, hefty liquidated damages, and/or employee indemnification of the
company’s enforcement costs.216 Some lawyers have sought to undermine
whistleblower bounty programs by drafting NDAs that waive the employee’s
right to government awards or even assign those awards to the company.217 The
inclusion of these provisions may chill whistleblowing even if they are likely to
ultimately prove unenforceable.218 The next section explores the contours of
NDA enforceability.
1. Enforceability of NDAs Against Whistleblowers
Courts presumptively enforce private commercial contracts in order to
provide predictability in the market economy and lower the transaction costs of

212. READ: 2016 Trump Campaign Nondisclosure Agreement, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018, 4:37 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/politics/trump-campaign-nda-omarosa/index.html.
213. Moberly, supra note 200, at 763–64.
214. Richard Moberly, Jordan A. Thomas & Jason Zuckerman, De Facto Gag Clauses: The Legality of
Employment Agreements That Undermine Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provisions, 30 ABA J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 87, 88 (2014).
215. KBR Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, at 2 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/2015/34-74619.pdf. This resulted in a fine of $130,000. Id. at 4.
216. See READ: 2016 Trump Campaign Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 212.
217. Moberly, supra note 200, at 766–67 (finding that 43.8% of settlement agreements in Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblower retaliation cases contained a waiver of future reward or recovery).
218. This is believed to be true of unenforceable contract provisions in general. See Harlan M. Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 682–83 (1960) (postulating that in the context of
invalid noncompete agreements, “[f]or every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which
exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations[.]”). Recognizing this
reality, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits any contractual waiver of rights or remedies provided for in its
whistleblower protection provisions, including the right to independent counsel. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(1), (h)(3);
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17 (2020).
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business.219 In rare instances, however, public policy may override the terms of
an otherwise valid agreement.220 Such public policy exceptions may be codified
by statute221 or, more controversially, pronounced by courts.222 Because no
statute (save Rule 21F-17) expressly bans the contractual silencing of
whistleblowers, this Subpart explores how courts have approached questions of
whether and when to enforce NDAs against them.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that contracts are enforceable
unless the interests of the party seeking enforcement are “clearly outweighed”
by the public policy imperative.223 In this balancing test, three factors weigh in
favor of enforcement: (1) the justifiable expectation of one or more parties that
the contract was enforceable;224 (2) whether the party seeking enforcement
would suffer a forfeiture, or the party seeking avoidance would be unjustly
enriched;225 and (3) whether there is any special public interest in favor of
enforcement.226 These factors must be weighed against: (4) the strength of the
public policy, particularly whether it is rooted in important legislation or
regulations;227 (5) the nexus between the contract and the public policy (that is,
the extent to which the court would further or undermine the policy by its
treatment of the contract);228 and (6) whether the contract involves

219. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541, 565 (2003) ([T]he state reduces social costs by giving parties that function in volatile markets the
opportunity to make enforceable contracts for future delivery.”).
220. See Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[T]he right of private contract is
no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and that the usual and most important function of courts of justice is
rather to maintain and enforce contracts than to enable parties thereto to escape from their obligation on the
pretext of public policy, unless it clearly appear [sic] that they contravene public right or the public welfare.”).
221. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898) (“This right of contract, however, is itself subject to certain
limitations which the State may lawfully impose in the exercise of its police powers.”). Many states, for example,
have forbidden health management organizations from contractually restricting the freedom of physicians to
discuss treatments. Robert Pear, Laws Won’t Let H.M.O.’s Tell Doctors What to Say, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17,
1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/17/us/laws-won-t-let-hmo-s-tell-doctors-what-to-say.html. In 2016,
Congress banned companies from using form contracts to prohibit or penalize customers who post negative
reviews. 15 U.S.C. § 45b(b)(1).
222. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 682 (1935) (“[T]he
courts have persisted in speculating (and in reaching divergent conclusions) as to whether the legislature
‘intended’ contracts to be treated as void when they ran afoul of laws which penalized some act of the contractors
but which said nothing concerning enforcement of the bargains.”); M.P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal
Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 308 (1965) (“It is well known that it is usually easier to decide a case than
to give reasons for the decision. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of public policy where the courts
are, ex hypothesi, dealing with matters outside their usual experience. The result has been an unusually large
proportion of decisions unquestionable in the result, but based on reasoning not convincingly or completely
adumbrated.”).
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981).
224. Id. § 178(2)(a).
225. Id. § 178(2)(b).
226. Id. § 178(2)(c).
227. Id. § 178(3)(a). The Restatement cautions against assigning undue weight to minor or attenuated
legislation or regulations. Id. § 178 cmt. c.
228. Id. § 178(3)(b), (d).
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“misconduct,” such as a promise or inducement to commit a tort or violate a
fiduciary duty.229
In practice, few courts explicitly utilize this balancing test, and observers
have long lamented the absence of a uniform judicial approach.230 One
consistent theme, however, is the importance of a legislative or regulatory hook
for the policy. The Supreme Court has cautioned that overriding a contract
requires “explicit public policy” that is “well defined and dominant [and
ascertainable] ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests.’”231 A recent empirical
study of contract cases found that public policy arguments rooted in a statute or
regulation had nearly twice the success rate of those appealing to general public
policy concerns.232
The enforcement of employee NDAs against whistleblowers pits the
commercial interest in confidentiality against the public interest in stopping
corporate misconduct. Whether courts enforce covenants for silence against
whistleblowers depends on a range of circumstances, including the policy
implicated, the manner of whistleblowing, and the extent of the disclosure. As
described below, courts are more receptive to public policy arguments where the
disclosure occurs in a legally prescribed and confidential manner and consists
only of information relevant to the misconduct. Cases can be broadly grouped
according to the specific public policy asserted:
•

Reporting Unlawful Activity.
Public policy strongly favors reporting criminal activity to law
enforcement.233 In a recent case, a federal court construed this public
policy more broadly than the protections of the state whistleblower

229. Id. § 178(3)(c); see also id. § 178 cmt. d, illus. 6–16. The comments give the example of a contract that
induces a party to vote in a particular way, and notes that although voting is not objectionable behavior, the
inducement thereof is offensive to democratic norms and expectations. Id.
230. See, e.g., Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing. 229, 252 (Burrough, J.) (Eng.)
(likening the public policy doctrine to a “very unruly horse,” in that “when once you get astride it you never
know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points
fail”); see also David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 563, 613–14 (2012) (examining a six-month range of cases and finding few uses of the Restatement’s
balancing test). State jurisprudence can vary considerably in its receptiveness to public policy arguments. One
study found that New York decisions show a broad indisposition towards them, while California courts exhibit
greater readiness to upset contracts that undermine good morals or “that sense of security for individual rights,
whether of personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought to feel.” Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargaining
on the Red-Eye: New Light on Contract Theory 25–27 (N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., CTR. FOR L. & ECON., Working Paper
No. 08-21, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1129805.
231. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Loc. Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States,
324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
232. Friedman, supra note 230, at 566.
233. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696–97 (1972) (“[I]t is obvious that agreements to conceal
information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public
policy.”); Fomby-Denson v. Dep’t of Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bowman v. Parma Bd.
of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 666–67 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that contracts cannot require the suppression
of criminal conduct).
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statute.234 An internal auditor identified securities law violations and
emailed incriminating documents to his mother to prevent their
destruction.235 The court declined to enforce the auditor’s NDA in
subsequent litigation, citing the fact that the auditor had carefully
selected incriminating documents and released them only to prevent
their destruction.236
Asserting Fraud Against the Government.
Courts generally decline to enforce NDAs against plaintiffs in qui
tam suits under the False Claims Act.237 A 2011 case suggests,
however, that this safe harbor may depend on the breadth of the
whistleblower’s disclosure. In Cafasso v. General Dynamics,238 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the company and
reserved judgment on a public policy exception to NDAs in qui tam
suits, finding that “[e]ven were we to adopt such an exception, it
would not cover Cafasso’s conduct given her vast and indiscriminate
appropriation” of company files.239 The court fretted that an
exception broad enough to protect Cafasso, who copied nearly
eleven gigabytes of data, “would make all confidentiality
agreements unenforceable as long as the employee later files a qui
tam action.”240 If the court were to adopt such a public policy
exception, it warned that qui tam plaintiffs would need to justify with
a “particularized showing” that the NDA violation was reasonably
necessary to pursue the fraud claim.241

•

•

Participating in Government Investigations.
Courts have overridden NDAs in favor of allowing participation in
government investigations. In one case, the First Circuit applied a
balancing test to determine that, despite the public policy strongly
favoring voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims,
settlement agreements prohibiting communication and cooperation
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are void as
against public policy.242
Providing Information in Litigation.

234. Erhart v. Bofl Holding, Inc., No. 15-CV-02287-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 588390, at *13–15 (S.D. Cal.
Feb. 14, 2017).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The court
held that a private agreement was unenforceable insofar as it required the qui tam plaintiff to return documents
that would likely be needed as evidence at trial. Id. Because Congress enacted the qui tam provision to encourage
disclosures of fraud against the government, and the FCA requires plaintiffs to submit all relevant evidence that
they possess, enforcing such an agreement would “unduly frustrate the purpose” of the law. Id.
238. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011).
239. Id. at 1062.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. E.E.O.C. v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996). Title VII expressly protects employees
from retaliation for participating in investigations. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a).
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Courts generally hold that NDAs cannot enjoin witness testimony in
official proceedings.243 The more complicated questions concern
whether NDAs enjoin employees from conferring with litigants and
providing information to develop their claims. To resolve these
questions, courts balance the interests of the litigants as well as any
broader public interest.244 Some courts have agreed to enjoin NDA
enforcement for interviews conducted under controlled conditions,
such as court preapproval of the questions, notice to the company
and an opportunity to attend the interview, and a prohibition on
interviewees disclosing privileged information or trade secrets.245
Conversely, they have generally enforced NDAs against employees
who initiate contact with plaintiffs and provide information without
court oversight.246
•

Protecting Public Health, Safety, and Welfare.
Some scholars contend that NDAs should not be enforced against
employees who disclose risks to public health, safety, or the
environment, regardless of whether there is a legal violation.247
Courts have considered but not generally validated this view,248
though they have occasionally shown sympathy for employers that
violate the nondisclosure provisions of severance agreements to

243. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Severn Trent Servs. Inc., 358 F.3d 438, 441 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The Commission
could have sought and obtained judicial enforcement of the subpoena, since obviously Murphy could not by
signing a contract excuse or disable himself from testifying.”); Zanders v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d
1127, 1133 (6th Cir. 1990) (opining in dicta that “[i]f we were compelled to address Zanders’ public policy
argument, we would nevertheless find it without merit . . . . [W]e note that the severance contract at issue here
expressly provides that the agreement would not bar her participation in proceedings when ‘required by law’”).
There are, however, countervailing cases, most notably that of former tobacco executive Jeffrey Wigand, who
reported to regulators and on national television that Brown & Williamson knew nicotine was addictive and
included chemical additives to increase its effects. Brown & Williamson successfully obtained an injunction
preventing him from testifying in lawsuits against the company. Rebecca Leung, Battling Big Tobacco: Mike
Wallace Talks to the Highest-Ranking Tobacco Whistleblower, CBS NEWS (Jan. 13, 2005),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/battling-big-tobacco/; Jodi L. Short, Killing the Messenger: The Use of
Nondisclosure Agreements to Silence Whistleblowers, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1207, 1209–11 (1999).
244. See, e.g., Astra U.S.A., 94 F.3d at 744.
245. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1137–39 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding that questions must be submitted and approved by the court, and enjoining employees from disclosing
privileged information or confidential business methods in securities litigation); Chambers v. Cap. Cities/ABC,
159 F.R.D 441, 445–46 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the defendant must have notice and an opportunity to
attend interviews in age discrimination litigation).
246. See, e.g., Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–23 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding that the
interest in enforcing the agreement overrode the public interest in uncovering defective products that did not
threaten public safety or wellbeing, and also that the former employee did not deserve classification as a
whistleblower because he acted from private rather than public motives in products liability litigation); Uniroyal
Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 97 F.3d 1452, 1996 WL 520789, at *10 (6th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (affirming
an injunction against a former employee who went to work for the plaintiff as an expert witness and consultant
in products liability litigation).
247. See, e.g., Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 681–82 (1999) (arguing that public health and safety should be considered perhaps the
most important public policy); Short, supra note 243, at 1212.
248. See Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
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warn that a former employee poses a risk to the public.249 Courts are
particularly unsympathetic to employees that report health and safety
concerns to the media.250 In one case, an employee allowed press to
enter the company premises after internal reports of contamination
went unheeded.251 The court found that this action was “not
protected by any public policy.”252

In balancing these public policy concerns against the employer’s interest
in confidentiality, courts have typically shown deference to the employer’s trade
secrets.253 This is reasonable in that many types of corporate wrongdoing, such
as employment discrimination, can be reported and adjudicated without the
disclosure of corporate trade secrets. In other cases, however, the facts
evidencing wrongdoing may not be cleanly divisible from legitimate trade
secrets. In the Theranos example, explaining the rigging of proficiency tests
might require the disclosure of protected details of the device mechanism itself.
In such cases, the DTSA’s immunity provision, while not expressly protecting
whistleblowers from contractual liability, strengthens and lends an important
statutory hook to a public policy defense. Moreover, the law may help to ensure
that any liability under an NDA results in minimal damages.
Even if an NDA ultimately proves unenforceable, it still serves the
employer’s interests in chilling disclosures. In many enforcement suits, the
employer’s goal is probably not to obtain damages – most workers are
effectively judgement-proof – but to intimidate the target and other potential
whistleblowers. Wealthy whistleblowers are better positioned to withstand the
threats and costs of lawsuits. This is evident in the Theranos case, where Alan
Beam (middle class and with a family to support) agreed to settle and Tyler
Shultz (from a wealthy family and without any dependents) did not.
An employee who contemplates whistleblowing ventures into a complex
and ambiguous legal landscape. Whistleblower protection statutes vary
substantially in their protectiveness based on the jurisdiction and subject matter.
Trade secret laws offer somewhat more uniformity, and the DTSA in particular
has taken important steps to harmonize how courts treat whistleblowers who
disclose trade secrets. Contractual principles, which govern the enforceability of
NDAs, may provide an additional cause of action to employers. They also
249. Giannecchini v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d 1006, 1012–14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (considering
the health and safety argument, but ultimately holding hospital liable for breaching the NDA that protected a
nurse’s personnel records); Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 44 Ohio App.3d 169, 176–78 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)
(refusing to enforce a confidentiality agreement protecting a teacher’s record of child molestation).
250. See, e.g., Erhart v. Bofl Holding, Inc., No. 15-CV-02287-BAS-NLS, 2017 WL 588390, at *15 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 14, 2017); Gosa v. Nu-World Amaranth, Inc., No. 10-CV-2074-LRR, 2012 WL 463023, at *4 (N.D.
Iowa Feb. 11, 2012).
251. Gosa, 2012 WL 463023, at *2.
252. Id. at *5.
253. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1134–37, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(excluding confidential business methods from the scope of information that may be disclosed by employees
during pre-deposition interviews); McGrane v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 822 F. Supp 1044, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(“Disclosures of wrongdoing do not constitute revelations of trade secrets . . . .”).
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introduce an additional measure of uncertainty for whistleblowers regarding
whether public policy in favor of protecting whistleblowers will preclude
enforcement of an NDA. As discussed further in Part V, whistleblowers may
find themselves in legal limbo at the intersection of these laws.

V. LESSONS FROM THERANOS
The Theranos story illustrates the plight of whistleblowers lost in an
unethical corporate culture and a discordant legal landscape. The result, as the
experience of Erika Cheung reveals, is needless legal exposure for
whistleblowers and delayed accountability for employers. This Part begins by
tracing Cheung’s long and risky path to legal protection. It then critically
assesses the whistleblower legal regimes, identifying flaws that contributed to
Cheung’s legal jeopardy and the perpetuation of Theranos’s misconduct.
Finally, it offers suggestions on reforming the law to secure reliable and
accessible protection for workplace whistleblowers.
A. THE ROAD TO PROTECTION AT THERANOS
Erika Cheung reported wrongdoing in three stages: internally to higherups; to a Wall Street Journal reporter; and finally, to the federal regulator. Her
trajectory, which put her in significant professional and legal jeopardy,
illuminates certain legal and practical obstacles to reporting corporate
misconduct.
Internal Reports. Cheung, along with her colleague Tyler Shultz, began
by expressing concerns to company leaders. California’s anti-retaliation statute
would only have protected these reports if she reasonably believed she was
reporting unlawful behavior. While Cheung plainly considered the proficiency
testing practices to be unethical and dangerous, it is not clear whether she
believed them unlawful or, indeed, whether she contemplated their legality at
all. It is therefore uncertain whether she would have been protected by California
law. Cheung certainly would not have enjoyed protection under federal law. The
FCA’s whistleblower provision would only have applied if she had expressly
connected her concerns to Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement. There is no
indication that she did so.
Media Reports. After resigning from Theranos, Cheung spoke to a
reporter on the condition of anonymity. These disclosures nevertheless proved
traceable to her, exposing her to liability under her NDA and perhaps also under
California’s trade secrets statute. The latter’s application depends on whether
she revealed trade secrets. A generic claim of corporate lawbreaking would not
constitute a trade secret, but her substantiating details about the blood testing
technology and protocols could conceivably fall within the trade secret ambit.
California’s trade secrets law, which is essentially coterminous with the UTSA,
contains no express exception for whistleblowing. Even the DTSA (which had
not yet been enacted) does not protect reports to the media. Likewise, courts will
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not shield employees who blow the whistle to the media from contractual
liability. In short, Cheung enjoyed no protection at this stage.
CMS Report. After receiving pro bono legal advice, Cheung reported
Theranos to CMS. By then, she had concluded that Theranos’s practices violated
proficiency testing regulations. She also directed her report to the appropriate
regulating agency. These factors would weigh strongly against enforcing her
NDA, provided that the scope of her disclosures was commensurate with the
legal violations. If her disclosures were found to contain trade secrets, however,
Cheung could still have faced potential liability under California’s trade secrets
statute. Today, the report to CMS would entitle Cheung to the DTSA’s
protections against liability under federal or state trade secrets laws. After years
of Theranos endangering the public with faulty blood tests, Cheung found a
somewhat secure path to holding her old company accountable.
Cheung’s inability to swiftly and securely report Theranos’s behavior
illuminates several flaws in the whistleblower legal framework. The following
section traces the obstacles she encountered to fundamental weaknesses in the
America’s patchwork of legal protections.
B. FLAWS IN THE PATCHWORK
The purpose of whistleblower protection is to promote legal compliance by
encouraging reports of corporate misconduct to internal supervisors and
regulators.254 In the case of Theranos, it failed spectacularly. In the absence of
clear, navigable, and reliable legal protections, the whistleblowers resorted to ad
hoc measures, which ultimately delayed actionable reports and put the
whistleblowers in significant jeopardy. This Subpart explores the purpose of
whistleblower protection and identifies weaknesses in the existing framework
that impede this purpose.
1. Whistleblower Protection in Theory
Behavioral economics informs us that individuals blow the whistle when
they believe the benefits will exceed the costs.255 The salient benefits and costs
may be intrinsic (i.e., feelings of gratification or guilt) or extrinsic (i.e., social
and material rewards or sanctions).256 The law can shape extrinsic incentives
through several mechanisms, including whistleblower protection.257 By
254. Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower Protection, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 586 (1999) (asserting that whistleblower protection “vindicates important interests
supporting the enforcement of criminal and civil laws”); Id. at 599 (explaining that protection of internal
disclosures “allows employers to address and resolve problems”).
255. Id. at 1183.
256. Id.
257. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards,
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1161–71 (2010). Other
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insulating workers from extrinsic costs imposed by employers, whistleblower
protection alters the balance of incentives. Protection is a particularly salient
factor for employees whose motivations are “intrinsic and moralistic” rather than
guided by self-interest.258 In addition to shaping extrinsic incentives, laws may
affect intrinsic motivations by coding certain behaviors as moral or immoral.259
Through this “expressive power,” whistleblower protection may reinforce the
wrongness of corporate misconduct and the rectitude of whistleblowing.260
In order to effectively shape motivations and behavior, whistleblower
protections must be known, navigable, and perceived as reliable by the workers
they target. Yet the protection cannot be so broad as to facilitate false or frivolous
accusations, which damage corporate reputations and overburden regulators.261
The goal, then, is to encourage reports of misconduct to internal or external
authorities while protecting legitimate business interests in confidentiality. The
Theranos case study illustrates several problems in the framework that impede
this policy goal. These are discussed below.
2. Weaknesses in the Legal Landscape
Part III explored some of the weaknesses in each of the three legal
frameworks. Together, they form a landscape with two broad deficiencies:
inaccessibility and uncertainty. These weaknesses increase the costs of reporting
misconduct and therefore tilt the balance of incentives against whistleblowing.
In the event that whistleblowers do proceed with their reports, the obstacles and
liabilities they encounter may ultimately deter others.
a. Inaccessibility.
Whistleblower protections can encourage reporting only if they are
known and navigable by employees. As the Theranos case study demonstrates,
workers are often unaware of their whistleblowing rights or how to vindicate
them. This is unsurprising, as the law entails little notice and much complexity.
mechanisms include affirmative reporting duties, penalties for non-reporting, and monetary awards for reporting.
Feldman and Yuval distill this spectrum to the shorthand of “protect, command, fine, pay.” Id. at 1157.
258. Id. at 1176. In a series of experiments, Feldman and Lobel found that where the intrinsic motivation is
high and protection is assured, other extrinsic incentives do not increase reporting levels. Id. at 1192–95. They
also found that women are much more motivated by the presence or absence of legal protection than men, who
are more motivated by rewards. Id. at 1196–97. Interestingly, they found that the insertion of extrinsic incentives
such as penalties or awards “may undermine the likelihood that misconduct will be reported by producing a
crowding-out effect in which the presence of external rewards dilutes the moral dimension of the act.” Id. at
1174–75 (citing On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law &
Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2109 (2008)). Indeed, awards may even carry a stigma. Id. at 1205.
259. Id. at 1183–84.
260. Id.
261. See Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam Provisions & The Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 949, 975 (2007) (inferring from the 73% dismissal rate of qui tam actions that a significant
portion are frivolous).
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First, workers do not receive effective notice of their rights. Although
California’s anti-retaliation statute requires employers to post a notice of
whistleblower rights, Cheung and Shultz were unaware of them. It appears that
Theranos either did not comply with the notice requirement, posted the notice in
a location where it escaped attention, or that this is simply not an effective way
to raise awareness. In the trade secrets domain, the DTSA requires companies to
include a whistleblower notice in any contract that addresses the confidentiality
of trade secrets. Failure to do so precludes certain damages and attorneys’ fees.
While this is a welcome measure, gaps remain: the DTSA does not require
employers to make the notice conspicuous or in plain English, or provide
workers with a copy for future reference. Moreover, the notice only needs to
cover trade secrets and not the myriad other information protected by NDAs.
With respect to this other proprietary information, employees receive no notice
of any potential exceptions to the NDA.
Second, many whistleblower protections require workers to exercise a
degree of legal awareness and judgment that may not be realistic. Many antiretaliation statutes only protect employees who “reasonably believe” their report
reveals a legal violation. Even the statutes with less demanding standards, such
as “suspect” or “believe in good faith,” effectively require that employees
contemplate the legality of the employer’s conduct, when in reality they may be
concerned about violations of internal policies, professional standards, industry
best practice, or simple common sense. It is not clear, for example, that Cheung
and Shultz believed Theranos was violating the law when they first raised
concerns internally. Ultimately, they demonstrated an unusual level of tenacity
and initiative, researching proficiency testing rules.262 This is not a realistic
expectation of the average worker.
Third, the legal landscape for whistleblowers, with its many piecemeal,
inconsistent, and overlapping provisions, is simply too complex for most nonattorneys to navigate successfully on their own. To secure protection, a
whistleblower must incur the transaction costs of identifying each liability risk,
determining whether it has whistleblower protections, and satisfying all
applicable standards and reporting protocols. When legal frameworks become
too complex, the cost of deciphering the complexity may exceed the benefits of
compliance. 263 At that point, an actor can either abandon the regulated activity
or abandon the legal safe harbor.264 A prospective whistleblower who is
confounded by the legal patchwork will likely refrain from whistleblowing or
blow the whistle in an unprotected manner.
One remedy for inaccessible laws is to consult counsel. This presents a
chicken-or-egg dilemma, though, since workers are unlikely to proactively seek
an attorney’s assistance unless they are already aware of the existence of
whistleblower protections. In the Theranos case, Cheung sought an attorney only
262. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 194.
263. Adam I. Muchmore, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Regulatory Design, 53 HOUSTON L. REV. 1321,
1335-37 (2016).
264. Id. at 1337.
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after exposing herself to legal liability by speaking to a reporter.265 Moreover,
consulting counsel does not ensure sound legal advice on whistleblower laws.
Cheung was unique among the Theranos whistleblowers to find an attorney who
advised her at no cost and understood the relevant laws. Tyler Shultz initially
sought advice from his grandfather’s estate attorney, who later referred him to a
boutique firm specializing in business disputes. He ultimately accumulated over
$400,000 in legal bills, but remained “completely unaware” of whistleblower
protections.266 The pseudonymous lab director “Alan Beam” unsuccessfully
tried to contact a boutique whistleblower firm before, in desperation, paying a
retainer to the first attorney who appeared in his internet search. 267 That lawyer’s
expertise was in medical malpractice and personal injury law.268 Rather than
advise Beam on avenues for whistleblowing, she recommended that he
acquiesce to Boies Schiller demands by deleting evidence of Theranos
wrongdoing from his computer.269 Finally, if consulting counsel is effectively
required to secure whistleblower protections, this strongly disadvantages the
many Americans who cannot afford an attorney.270
b. Uncertainty.
Even if a whistleblower ascertains their rights in advance, their path
forward is laden with uncertainties. The importance of legal certainty depends
on the purpose and context of the law.271 When a law is designed to
disincentivize undesirable behavior, setting precise limits can encourage people
to venture very close to that limit without fear of enforcement.272 It can also

265. Erika
Cheung,
A
Journey
to
Speaking
Truth
in
Power,
TEDXBERKELEY,
https://www.ted.com/talks/erika_cheung_a_journey_to_speaking_truth_in_power/transcript?language=en (last
visited July 31, 2021).
266. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 245; Id. at 287 (describing the toll of the legal threats on Shultz’s family);
Stephen Kurczy, Lessons from the Theranos Whistleblower, COLUM. BUS. SCH. (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/ideas-work/lessons-theranos-whistleblower (“There actually are a lot of
protections for whistleblowers that I was completely unaware of when I was doing all this.”).
267. CARREYROU, supra note 3, at 214, 217.
268. Id. at 217.
269. Id. at 217–18.
270. A 2017 survey indicated that 86% of the time low-income Americans receive inadequate or no
professional help for civil legal problems. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 30 (June 2017), https://www.lsc.gov/
sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf.
271. Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, 74-SPG LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 133, 133 (2011); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919 (1998) (“In corporate law, business planning needs render legal determinacy
vital.”). Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Antonin Scalia were vocal advocates for greater certainty in law.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881) (“[T]he tendency of the law must always be to
narrow the field of uncertainty.”); Antonin Scalia, The Rules of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179 (1989) (“Predictability…is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name. There are times when
even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.”).
272. Muchmore, supra note 263, at 1360.
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facilitate the exploitation of loopholes.273 Conversely, a law intended to
encourage desirable behavior may do so more effectively when the incentives
are clear and reliable. Whistleblower protections are principally designed to
encourage whistleblowing by reducing the associated risk ex ante. In this
context, uncertainty impedes risk reduction and therefore subverts the purpose
of the law.
The whistleblower landscape produces several types of uncertainty. The
first type of uncertainty arises when different legal frameworks intersect. The
nonretaliation, trade secrets, and contract laws exist in parallel silos.
Antiretaliation statutes do not expressly shield whistleblowers from liability.
The DTSA only shields whistleblowers from liability under trade secrets laws.
With respect to contracts, the public policy doctrine provides a tool to navigate
tensions between NDAs and whistleblower protections, but its contours are
uncertain. Because these frameworks are not harmonized, a whistleblower may
need to satisfy different and potentially conflicting standards to secure
protection.
The second type of uncertainty arises in the process of vindicating
whistleblower protections. The duration, costs, and outcomes are not sufficiently
predictable to provide reassurance. Courts and administrative agencies generally
interpret nonretaliation laws narrowly and unfavorably to employees. The
DTSA suffers from a language ambiguity,274 labeling its whistleblower
provision an “immunity” but not specifying the procedural implications of that
term. Without a clear directive, courts have thus far defaulted to treating the
provision as an affirmative defense, much to the detriment of whistleblowers
who cannot have cases dismissed at the pleadings stage. Finally, courts are far
from uniform in their approach to public policy defenses against NDA
enforcement. The outcome of a contract enforcement action may depend on the
nature of the misconduct, the scope of the disclosure, and the particular court’s
disposition towards policy arguments. In sum, even whistleblowers who are
informed of their rights may face lengthy, costly, and uncertain litigation.
A third type of uncertainty comes from the use of standards instead of rules
in the whistleblower laws.275 Standards require ex post examination of the
circumstances, whereas rules are determinable ex ante.276 In practice, these poles
are situated on a spectrum rather than discrete categories.277 In the whistleblower
273. Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX.
REV. 241, 249 (2007) (explaining that ex ante rulemaking creates unintended loopholes that authorities lack the
flexibility to punish).
274. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are all Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
980, 988–89 (2009) (describing uncertainty that arises from ambiguities in language).
275. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992).
276. Id. For example, a speed limit of 50 mph is a rule because motorists know exactly what compliance
entails and how to avoid violating the law. Requiring motorists to drive a “reasonable speed” is a standard
because motorists do not know exactly how fast they can drive until it is adjudicated after the fact. See also
Muchmore, supra note 263, at 1333.
277. Muchmore, supra note 263, at 1333.
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context, many statutes only protect reporters who “reasonably believe” they are
reporting a legal violation. 278 Such standards make whistleblowers vulnerable
to courts that may decide their belief was unreasonable. Unfortunately, it may
not be feasible to eliminate this uncertainty. A more objective rule could entail
protecting all reports, but this would facilitate frivolous or false accusations.
Alternatively, a more objective rule could require an actual violation of law, but
this would put the burden on workers to exercise legal judgment before
reporting. Given the downsides to making the standards more rule-like, it may
suffice to make the standards more favorable to whistleblowers. A “good faith
belief” or “suspected” standard is more forgiving than a reasonableness
standard. They also provide more certainty, since whistleblowers have more
insight into their own mental state than they have knowledge of the law.
In light of the weaknesses explored above, the following Subpart offers
principles for a legal framework that will more effectively facilitate
whistleblowing.
C. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM
The weaknesses detailed above militate for reform to improve the
accessibility and certainty of whistleblower protections. This Subpart highlights
features that will reduce the costs of whistleblowing and thus encourage reports
of misconduct. They do not comprise an exhaustive blueprint, but a starting point
to remediate certain weaknesses that emerge from the Theranos case study and
examination of the legal landscape.
Harmonized Minimum Protections. The patchwork of legal protections
creates unnecessary complexity and risks for potential whistleblowers. The
simplest and most effective way to address this weakness is by harmonizing
minimum protections into a single federal statute that expressly inoculates
private sector whistleblowers from both retaliation and all forms of liability,
including contractual, tort, and statutory liability. This would provide
prospective whistleblowers with more reliable protection and a single,
accessible path to protected disclosure. State and federal policymakers could, of
course, offer enhanced protections and rewards for specific legal violations that
they deem to be especially pernicious.
Swift Path to Dismissal of Claims. Current law subjects whistleblowers
to the prospect of lengthy and expensive litigation. To mitigate this problem,
Professor Menell intended and advocated for the DTSA’s whistleblower
protection to be treated as an immunity rather than an affirmative defense. Such
an interpretation would curtail legal actions initiated against whistleblowers for
the purpose of intimidation or deterrence. It would also help to assure
whistleblowers that any litigation could be concluded with relative speed. Given
the courts’ failure to interpret the provision as intended, a harmonized statute
278. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1703(1) (2021).
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should explicate the procedural implications of immunity with greater
specificity.
Forgiving Standard. Knowledge of the law and access to legal counsel
are significant barriers to protected whistleblowing. A harmonized statute
should recognize this reality by minimizing the burden of legal knowledge on
the part of whistleblowers. This means covering information that the worker
“believes in good faith” or “suspects” constitutes a violation of any federal, state,
or local law or regulation, or a danger to the health and safety of employees or
the public.
Effective Notice. To facilitate whistleblowing through official channels
and minimize employer intimidation, the law must mandate effective
notification to workers of their rights. Here, the DTSA and SEC rules provide
instructive but incomplete models. Employers should be required to provide
written notice of whistleblower protections to all workers, in plain language
mandated by law. Such language should make clear that whistleblower
protections override any other contractual commitments or duties to the
company. As under the DTSA, failure to provide such notice should reduce the
employer’s right to damages under any theory of law for acquisition, use, or
disclosure of its otherwise protectable information.
There is probably an absolute limit to the effectiveness of any written
notice. Studies have repeatedly shown that the public often does not read,
understand, and/or use the information contained in mandated disclosures.279
This is true even of disclosures designed to be simple, like nutrition labels.280
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider attribute the failure of
mandated disclosures to an “overload effect” (disclosures are far too long and
technical for people to understand) and an “accumulation problem” (disclosures
are too ubiquitous in American life for people to engage with them
meaningfully).281 That said, a prospective whistleblower concerned about
liability risk is probably more likely than the average employee to consult the
language of their NDA. To the extent that notice can make a marginal difference
in employees’ awareness of their whistleblower rights, it remains worthwhile.

VI. CONCLUSION
The rise and fall of Theranos offers insights and critical lessons regarding
the legal treatment of whistleblowers. The woman who triggered the first
regulatory response to Theranos’s dangerous and unlawful practices contended
with an unfavorable internal and external environment, from the company’s
repressive and unethical culture, to an uncertain and inaccessible web of legal
protections.

279. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647,
665–79 (2011).
280. Id. at 675–76.
281. Id. at 687–90.
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Erika Cheung’s experience illuminates shortcomings in the whistleblower
legal regime that needlessly expose whistleblowers to liability and deter reports
of misconduct. These shortcomings create individual, institutional, and public
costs. All three Theranos whistleblowers endured legal threats and professional
dislocation, and two incurred substantial financial losses. The delay in
actionable reports also spelled disaster for the company’s stakeholders. While
bankruptcy was likely inevitable, earlier exposure could have spared investor
capital. Finally, the public was unnecessarily subjected to the risk of faulty blood
tests.
The Theranos case study should prompt consideration of a harmonized
legal framework that will increase the certainty and accessibility of
whistleblower protection. In a culture that valorizes dynamic startups and
founders who promise to change the world, Theranos is a reminder of the
importance of empowering the workers with the levers of accountability.

